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Introduction:
A Road Map and a Collective Dream

This project, first and foremost, is about connection. I want to find new ways for you and
I to connect linguistically, somatically, enthusiastically. I want to propose a new model for
thinking about how sexuality, in particular sexual harm, has been publically arbitrated. The
current liberal consent model has failed many, it has failed me. I want to use what I know to find
a way to fix this, to prevent further harm, and to provide frameworks for healing and learning to
connect again. When this work was first conceived, I found myself trying so hard to be an expert
that I forgot to be a lover. What a grave mistake I made. I want to work together with you, with
respect guiding this meditation. Hopefully, my dear reader, you and I can find some intimacy and
care in our joint endeavor into the topics of eroticism and consent. Perhaps we can even discover
new loves within ourselves and one another at once, maybe we can feel the distinctions and
divisions slipping away as we work in tandem.
This piece has a few moving parts that I fit together in order to build up a critique of the
liberal consent model. Liberal consent, distinct from consent, is a model that operates on an
institutional basis. Consent, as I define it, is a term used to interpret the nature or quality of an
experience interpersonally. It is a term people can use to express the way situations make them
feel. Liberal consent is different, because it operates on a larger scale. It assumes that the
codification of rights is enough to protect these rights. I do not think that this liberal
presupposition holds water, particularly in cases of sexual violence. In order to think through
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new possibilities for how to confront and limit sexual violence outside of a liberal frame, I use
Luce Irigaray and Audre Lorde, alongside Friedrich Nietzsche. From Irigaray and Nietzsche, I
draw out the central tenets of intersubjectivity and distance. I use intersubjectivity to speak about
a type of relation that privileges mutuality, both people are full subjects in each other’s eyes. This
type of relation is expressed by a rejection of possession, and attempts to use language in crafty
ways to prevent the impression of one person’s will onto the other. Distance is used in the
colloquial sense, but does not have a negative association. Nietzsche considers distance to be
necessary for meaningful interrelation, in the sense that attempting to be too close to another can
lead to avaritic consumption. Following a more exhaustive outlining of how these two thinkers
conceive of connection, I will begin a case study of the reaction to the institution of the Antioch
code and the #MeToo movement. Particularly focusing in on #MeToo, I pin down what I
conceive of as the failures of the liberal consent model.
With these failures in mind, I begin to pave my way towards a starting place for what I
call the intersubjective relational model using Audre Lorde’s account of the erotic as a source of
power. The erotic is a force, born of chaos, that is a repository of information and knowledge. It
is uniquely feminine in nature and has been intentionally devalued in order to prevent women
from gaining power through self-knowledge. The opposite of the erotic is pornography, which
Lorde argues has been deliberately confused with the erotic in order to disempower feminine
people. I indict the liberal consent model as pornographic in nature, as it fails to recognize the
importance of feeling and somatic experience as a guide for intimate relation. This begs the
question, what would an alternative to the liberal model look like? I would like to be clear that I
do not seek to lay out some clear boundaries or prescriptions in regards to my proposed
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alternative, the intersubjective relation model. I view it as a starting point, a way to adapt
thinking about consent. I am interested in what it might feel like, and what radical directives
might be built into a model of consent that draws on erotic power and intersubjectivity to
substantiate itself.
I would like to take a moment to recognize that I use the word woman quite a bit in this
work, I am aware that sexual violence is not solely a women’s issue and that people who are not
women can be survivors of sexual violence. I use the word woman more loosely, in the sense that
I am using it as a stand-in for a specific experience: the sex based oppression that accompanies
being assigned female at birth. This focus is not an attempt to devalue gender-based oppression,
or to situate gender based oppression and sex based oppression as diametrically opposed. The
two operate in tandem. The next section is a site of calibration. A pit stop, a poetic rumination
that may or may not help you get into a mindspace of terror, joy, and deeper feeling in the hopes
that you can begin to imagine a new world for yourself as this project comes into view.

Already, A Diversion
Perhaps we should begin with this seemingly simple statement: I am not a puritan, and I
find puritanism to be a danger in itself. Though there are no more true 17th century protestants,
and new research has revealed that historical accounts of their sexual and intimate lives may
have been reductive and inaccurate, as I live and breathe I feel the spectre of the Puritan lurking.
This puritanism is Godless, no promises of pearly gates, virgin wives, or eternal life underpin it.
It is an impulse to control and restrict intimate life for the sake of itself. The conversations
surrounding intimacies and connection in our time have, on my view, become less generous,
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generative, and imaginative. This is the crux of what we are setting out to explore together. I
hope to convince you that my concerns about sex have broader implications about the ways
people connect with and understand one another. Perhaps these are not only a problem for the
sexually active or the college student to attend to, maybe they diagnose something sinister about
the way relation has been constructed. This is a requiem for the sexual revolution, yet another
loving reading of Herr Nietzsche, and an uplifting of the immortal genius of Audre Lorde. This is
a poetic project, one that aims at once to speak to the polyphonic nature of connection: the very
real fear and anxiety connection provokes. If you are a housewife or a sex fiend or a testo junkie
I welcome you. If you are a Puritan I open my arms to you just the same.
To give us a lay of the land, let us all begin together in a dream. Friedrich Nietzsche gives
an account in The Gay Science that may allow us to orient ourselves in the stupor of the world of
slumber.
“I suddenly woke up in the midst of this dream, but only to the consciousness that I am dreaming
and that I must go on dreaming lest I perish -- as a somnambulist must go on dreaming lest he
fall. [...] among all these dreamers, I, too, who “know” am dancing my dance; that the knower is
a means for prolonging the earthly dance and thus belongs to the masters of ceremony of
existence; and that the sublime consistency and interrelatedness of all knowledge perhaps is and
will be the highest means to preserve the universality of dreaming and the mutual comprehension
all of the dreamers and thus also the continuation of the dream.” (Nietszche, 116)
What might this mean for us? How might we untangle the cat's cradle that Nietzsche
thrusts upon us in the shared dream?
We wake up, and yet are aware that we are dreaming. Our awareness of the dream does
nothing to change the fact of our condition, we are not awake and becoming awake in this
moment feels akin to death. Thus we have no choice but to take up the dream as the real, this not
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a difficult choice -- if anything it is predetermined. Amongst the other dreamers, those who
appear to us to be unaware of the dream, we are still part of a broader whole. We are giving
ourselves over to the Dionysian folly that is the collective need to dream and be together. There
is shared knowledge and pleasure in the mutual understanding that irrespective of whether this is
a dream or some other spectre, that is not our chief concern. We are to dream in the face of our
own knowledge, our own perceived power of self-awareness. As we dance together we are
artfully cultivating mutual preservation. What a beautiful image! What a charge and a call
Nietzsche presents. The dance, the embodiment of our emotions and our alterity brings us all into
some collective being. To be a dancer has no conditions, it is a fate, and a compulsion, to be in
somatic communication with one another. It is unclear whether we are all aware of the state we
are in, but that does not make a difference.
You may remark “well I am a terrible dancer” or “dancing in front of others would be my
greatest humiliation.” That is fair, and may well be true, but regardless you dance. This image of
the dance provokes me, my first introduction to this passage brought me to tears. I think it
reflects, for me, what being in the world is about. It is not a matter of knowledge or will or
ability, it is a joint compulsion and necessity to relate. Reader, you and I are in this world
together whether it causes us to tremble or not. However much I try to hide myself away from
you or make myself inscrutable, there is still the universal nature of being, of dancing, that
tethers us. We may not be able to perceive each other clearly as we are moving and gyrating in
ways that clouds our sight. The streaks of color in my peripheral vision, that in my mind
constitute you, may be the most I could ever access you. To be clear: being together does not
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make us the same, the way we move lays that bare. Our difference is palpable and yet we are tied
up in the same ritual, the same dreamscape.
I read so much beauty into this dream, but I am also aware that it is a fearsome place.
There is so much that I cannot know about you, I cannot know that perhaps the way you dance
the way you do is because Rhapsody in Blue is blaring inside of your head. I cannot know if you
are imagining your greatest love dancing with you. There are some things we cannot know about
one another that in the waking world might strike fear into our heart. Yet, here, with you, it
seems that terror escapes me. This does not mean I have no reason to be afraid.
There is an even grander beast lurking and yet we may not hear the echo of its footfalls in
the distance, or its heartbeat pounding just below our feet. Sure, you may be a mystery to me, but
at least I can speak of you. I can imagine a rough outline of you and sketch it if need be. But
what about that which, in the frenzy of our dance, I cannot even begin to imagine, let alone speak
of? I have blindspots, I cannot see everyone and perhaps there are people I could not even
envision having the necessary faculties to join our dance. Those blindspots terrify me.
When Julia Kristeva speaks of relation, she also speaks of abjection. It “is immediately
defined as a revolt of being (as a twisted braid of affects and thoughts), a revolt against a threat
from an exorbitant 'something' (not a thing) inside or outside the subject, something close but
unassimilable which both fascinates and frightens or disgusts desire.” (Kristeva, 222) That is the
terror I feel as we move together. There is something about this beast that I know is at once both
like and unlike me, I sense it but I cannot speak to it. Even if I could, I know it would not
understand me. It is sublime, and thus I fear it. I cannot tidy it up or perceive its borders and yet I
feel its scalding heat at my back. My play and reverie is undergirded by a sense of threat. For all
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I know this thing could be human. It could be me. It could be everything I hope others could
never sense about me. And now I am afraid, I am petrified, though you may not be. You may still
be caught up in the dance, and maybe quite bravely, you have found a way to use the beast’s
heartbeat and heat as a rhythmic guide. If you are afraid too, I cannot guarantee comfort. It seems
to be a paralytic state of affairs. The beast will never die, no mythic hero could vanquish it. We
must find a way to live with it, to dance with it, lest we perish.
I want to believe that there is something beautiful about not needing to know. To
convince myself that there is dignity in floating above, in traipsing through suffering and joy
alike with a childlike sensitivity. To be able to affirm that I am in the world with others and that
is enough. If I could wholeheartedly believe in this affirmation, why would I insist on collapsing
onto my knees and digging and breaking up the topsoil when there is so much breadth in looking
out over the flatlands and seeing everything that could approach me from a distance? Perhaps it
is a matter of never being satisfied, always being parched and starving and maladjusted. Perhaps
there, too, is some dignity in breaking up something that seems so whole and so impenetrable.
Regardless of the impulse, I shall continue my jaunt towards the beast. I need to know it, if I
cannot kill it. I would be so honored if you were to join up with me in this odyssey. Your
difference and disagreement entices me.
I sense there may be a self-sacrificial tinge to my expedition, so let us pause and take up
someone whose work sought to get at the problems that may arise between you and I.
“If I put to death or grant death to what I hate, it is not a sacrifice. I must sacrifice what I love. I
must come to hate what I love, in the same moment, at the instant of granting death. I must hate
and betray my own, that is to say offer them the gift of death by means of the sacrifice, not
insofar as I hate them -- that would be too easy -- but insofar as I love them. Hate would not be
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hate if it hated only the hateful, that would be too easy. I must hate and betray what is most
loveable. Hate cannot be hate, it can only be the sacrifice of love to love.” (Derrida, 65)
Derrida formulates “tout autre est tout autre” or “every other is completely other” as an
attempt to explain the nature of responsibility that comes about in the confrontation that is
connection. The reminder that every other is completely other is a charge to see and appreciate
the specificity of each person. I become responsible and tethered to you by way of transcending
whatever ire I have for you in order to love that you are miraculously other. You trigger both awe
and horror in me by way of your existence. This charges you and me to look at each other no
matter how much we might want to turn away. I might suggest we walk side by side in the hope
that we might not glimpse one another in the periphery.
I must say, because you are here I love to you. And I hate that you could be here in the
first place. This work is an unleashing of the creativity erotic power provides. It is my love letter,
and my eulogy for ways of approaching the other that cannot bear the weight of relation. I cannot
see myself as you see me and your gaze rests on me nonetheless. I will do my best to treat you as
wholly other, not because it pleases either of us but because it is my duty, I am responsible to you
by virtue of you being here with me.
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Chapter 1: I Love To You
The Language of Love and the Primacy of Intersubjectivity

Introduction
Difference defines the nature of relation and though, so often, the distance that arises as a
result can feel repellant, I am interested in how that rupture might be necessary in understanding
the nature of love. Nietzsche argues that we conceive of love and avarice as one and the same,
but that this possessive love is nothing more than an attempt to rule over the other from the
inside out. He makes it clear that an attempt to close this disconcerting rift between you and I can
ultimately ruin the particularity of how we came to know and appreciate each other in the first
place. Instead of attempting to rule over you, he suggests that I should embrace the distance that
allows you and I to be people in our own right. If I recognize that this chasm between you and I
is what makes our relationship fruitful, I can focus on our shared goal of deepening our
connection. I can come to know you more when I seek to understand you rather than seek to
possess you.
Preservation of subjectivity is at the core of the relation Nietzsche advocates for, the
French philosopher Luce Irigaray is one of the primary advocates for loving intersubjectivity.
She pins language as a potential site of reorienting what types of relations are privileged. The
very phrase “I love you” seems to be avaritic, the verb love operates as a vector for me to exert
my will and feelings onto you. However, silence is not a viable solution. Language, too, is able
to dance and play and birth connection. If language can express avarice, so too, can it express
that I cannot force you to connect to me. You must have your own choice in the matter. Irigaray
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offers the formulation “I love to you” as a means of recognizing that love is a journey towards
mutual understanding in choice. When I love to you, I do not presuppose ownership over you.
Instead, I stake my subjectivity as a lover in your direction and allow you to do with it what you
will. There is a risk here, perhaps my love will be rebuffed and fall to the bottom of the abyss
between us. But risk is necessary to preserve you and I both as subjects with our own will.

An Allegory
There is something important about the difference between you and me. That distance,
that separation, rears its ugly head when something about me feels like it is collapsing into you.
The interplay is crushing, and yet it seems there is more often than not a space between us that
fends off a caving in. The space between us is disgusting, it is a leprotic sore that never quite
seems to scab over. I want us to stick our fingers in that sore, to excavate it and feel the gush of it
and be repulsed together. With this in mind, I would like you to imagine falling in love. You do
not need to be convinced that this is the love to end all loves, or that what you are feeling is the
most profound feeling you may ever feel. Merely imagine that you have met someone special in
the springtime.
After taking lazy strolls in the sun and drinking cheap iced coffee far too late in the day
for a few months, you awake in a dream to the realization that something has shifted. You know
that this something cannot yet be revealed, not even to your waking self. There is something
incongruous and stilted about the two of you endeavoring to love one another. Whenever I first
fall in love, I imagine that I am too imperfect to cast out into something so profound, because I
am too imperfect. I miss plastic straws and I smoke cigarettes inside. So often it is the most
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superficial things that justify guarding against taking a plunge into something so nebulous as
love.
Gradually though, your love starts to bubble up through the cracks of your dreamscape
and burst forth and suddenly the two of you are sitting in a nice patch of grass or on a couch or in
a restaurant and you confess your love. By some miracle, this love is reciprocated, and they
return the “I love you.” This confession, this affirmation, changes things. It introduces new
stakes and considerations and shifts the earth’s axis. Perhaps you, my dear reader, have some
sense of what you mean and what you owe when you tell a lover that you love them. That is a
triumph. I will admit that when I say I love you I have not the faintest idea what I mean. What I
do know, is that when I expect the gap between me and the person I love to close, it only
deepens. The flesh of our relation gets inflamed and repulsive, more bloody and sick than it had
ever been before. Questions I have been taught would be answered by the mere power of love are
only complicated. And I am afraid. I have a problem, one that I brought upon myself.

The Things People Call Love
When I am confused about where I might go, I turn to Nietzsche. I pray you will humor
me as I venture into The Gay Science once again to maybe find a way to begin to get at this
lesion of love. In Book One, Section 14 of the text: The things people call love, Nietzsche takes
to task the aforementioned conflation of love and avarice. He claims that the former is merely an
inept attempt at disguising the latter; expressing doubts about the distinction, provoking his
reader to wonder if, in fact, they are so different after all. Perhaps, possession is what constitutes
most of what people name love. This is partially a problem of language, a problem I will return
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to, however Nietzsche primarily focuses on another consequence of the things people call love.
He remarks upon the urge for the lover to turn themselves into a despot in the kingdom of their
own construction. The lover deludes themself into believing that if they are truly to be loved,
they must conquer the interiority and exteriority of the other. In order to love and be loved in the
way they desire, they attempt to efface the interiority of the single person they purport to care for
“Sexual love betrays itself most clearly as a lust for possession: the lover desires unconditional
and sole possession of the person for whom he longs; he desires equally unconditional power
over the soul and over the body of the beloved; he alone wants to be loved as desires to live and
rule in the other soul as supreme and supremely desirable” (Nietzsche, 89). Intimacy and
closeness can easily mutate into a sort of psychic war, love is strung up between the avaritic
lover and their prey.
In Over the footbridge, Nietzsche paints the portrait of two friends as close as can be on
the emotional level, merely separated by a footbridge “Just as you were about to step on it, I
asked you: “Do you want to cross the footbridge to me?” -- Immediately you did not want to
anymore; and when I asked you again you remained silent.” (Nietzsche, 90) Their relationship
changes radically as a result of this seemingly harmless proposition. How could the mere
suggestion of the approach, in effect, do the opposite of its intent? It hinges on the possibility
that Nietzsche sees distance to be a necessary fact of intimate connection. Notably, at the end of
section 13, we are advised to value friendship above other intimate arrangements “here and there
on earth we may encounter a kind of continuation of love in which this possessive craving of two
people for each other gives way to a new desire and lust for possession -- a shared high thirst for
an ideal above them. [...] Its right name is friendship” (Nietzsche, 89). For one friend to propose
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to the other that they reside together on the same side of the footbridge is not only to propose the
impossible, but it is to disbar the basis on which a good friendship is built. Rather than attending
to their shared ideals and the rich conversation that built their brotherhood, I trade friendship for
possession by questioning the movements of the companion. This leads to an irreconcilable
schism. To treat the other as though they could not choose to cross the footbridge of their own
volition, to entreat them to do what would only appear natural, is to attempt to rule over them.
The problem of intimacy that Nietzsche presents in The Gay Science, the question of
“how close is too close before everything falls apart?” is a common theme in the soul ballads of
the post-war America of the 1950s and 60s. Notably, The Royal Jesters wrestle with distance and
possession on their track “Take Me For A Little While.” Their refrain “I've been trying to make
you love me/ But everything I try/ Just takes you further from me” speaks to the difficulty of the
interpersonal approach. Yes, love is here and is worth pursuing, however there can be a distance
that becomes impossible to bridge between two lovers “Since then, mountains and torrential
rivers and whatever separates and alienates has been cast between us, and even if we wanted to
get together, we couldn’t” (Nietzsche, 90). The artists seem to think the solution to their problem
is to continue to push, to continue to confront the problem of unknowability head on no matter
how much it causes their predicament to deteriorate, when they croon “I've got to stop it/ There
should be a law (baby, I need you)/ But no matter how you put me down/ I love you more/ I feel
so helpless (baby, I need you)/ And it ain't funny (you know that I need you)/ 'Cause deep down
inside I know/ You're never gonna love me.”
This track seems to be a convergence of the ideas Nietzsche provokes in the
aforementioned sections of the Gay Science. The Royal Jesters confuse love and avarice. It
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seems their desire to love this unnamed person totally consumes them, to the point that they fail
to recognize their lover’s interiority as a subject. Disturbingly, their need to receive love
unequivocally clouds the possibility that this love is conditional or specific in nature. Further,
there is no space for their lover to dance, to blur and remain imperceptible by way of movement.
Were this person to twirl, to bend and snap to the rhythm of the drums, of the dream, they would
be too far out of reach to even be considered a lover in the sense The Jesters would want them to
be. Every other is no longer completely other once they become mine, in others words “if one
considers, finally, that to the lover himself the whole rest of the world appears indifferent, pale,
worthless, and he is prepared to make any sacrifice, to disturb any order, to subordinate all other
interests [...] indeed that this love has furnished the concept of love as the opposite of egoism
while it actually may be the most ingenious expression of egoism.” (Nietzsche, 89) Thus this
dream descends into a nightmare, into the eternal tragedy of what one might call unrequited love.
I, as a reader of Nietzsche, would be apt to recognize this is nothing like love in the first place.
To demand a lover, a friend, a confidant, to cross the footbridge is a fatal mistake; as both
subjects come into direct confrontation with being made object, of being soiled by the
prescription and the gaze of the other.
We return to the dream, and luckily the festivities have not stopped on account of our
absence. Though I have already taken interest in how this dance feels, and what exists outside of
it, I have yet to interrogate how this ritual could hang together. As we begin to move together
again, something new presents itself. Before, I feared the blindspots of the interiority of the other
dreamers, not knowing what inspired or scaffolded their movements but now I come to realize
that was the monstrosity of my own avarice. This folly can only sustain itself because I would
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never do something so disruptive as asking you to dance, asking you to traverse the footbridge
and join me on the opposite side, doing so would shatter the dreamscape. This happening only
continues to happen because it is not put forth, or arbitrated. It is merely understood “the sublime
consistency and interrelatedness of all knowledge perhaps is and will be the highest means to
preserve the universality of dreaming and the mutual comprehension of all dreamers and thus
also the continuation of the dream.” (Nietzsche,116) The relationship between us as the dreamers
has stakes, though the dream is for the sake of itself. It is worth noting that our little jaunt away
to talk about love did not startle anyone awake. There is something worth working towards and
preserving. Without the dream, the higher purpose, we would not be so fervent in our dancing, in
our relation to one another. I do not seek to possess or to prescribe. I would never ask you to
dance and instinctively I know you would never ask me. We are bound in this way. And thus the
love that all of us dancers share for one another as members of a collective body cannot be
subsumed.

A New Language
Nietzsche has gotten me closer to what I would like to mean when I confess my love. I
know now that when it comes to my lover, there is such a thing as too close. Though my first
instinct is to seek to live inside of them and make a home in the soft tissue of their tummy,
gorging myself on the already masticated contents of their stomach, I have learned that this is an
affront to my affections for them. I should seek something more righteous and complex than
consuming or allowing myself to be consumed. Their insides are not mine to colonize and claim
as my own. More creatively, more hopefully, I should dance with them. Without imitating them
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or anticipating how they might move next. Without taking stock of and categorizing their every
movement for later analysis. Moving together captures their subjectivity and their otherness far
better than a hostile takeover for the sake of knowing them ever could. As an other they are
completely other to me, and that is what makes them worth loving. Nietzsche highlights that
needing to crack everything open is a tragic farce, it would “barter away intensity for mere
representations.” (Deleuze, 146) Something is lost when appearance is devalued and evacuated
for the sake of certainty. After all, merely glimpsing a lover or a true friend can be enough.
Nietzsche might feel like a patch of clear sky in the eye of the storm to you, he does to
me. If not, that is fine too, there is still much exploration left to be done. Though, now I may
have a better sense of what I mean when I confess my love, or at least a better idea of what such
a confession should not mean. I am sure, by way of my dreams and the warmth of the sun
beating against their skin, that my lover is something of their own invention. Something about
them escapes me and that is why I find them so beautiful, in some ways they are completely
alien to me. However, this knowledge alone does not totally conquer the sparks of terror inside
of me. The avaritic monster fights back. But now I know that it is twisted to not wage war
against it.
When I do something as egregious as mistake love for avarice or claim to know what my
lover says when they proclaim to love me, I do a disservice to them and their subjectivity. I am
the Lord and they are the Bondsman, and tragically there is no labor that allows them to come
into themselves. My lover stands before me, stripped naked and transparent, waiting for me to
project onto them all of the hopes I have for the both of us. They are no longer themselves, they
could not even begin to approach subjectivity. It would be hard to argue that they are even
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human in my eyes. I have taken on their life as merely an extension of my own. They are my
creation, my deus ex machina, by way of their existence I know that I have built a world. All of
this because I love them.
Perhaps mere moments ago when I confessed my love, I should have held my tongue;
though I doubt silence could solve a problem so entrenched as this one. Perhaps this authoritarian
that lives inside of me took hold while I was dreaming of the mere possibility of love. And now
that gash between us, the one that I created, will never scab over. This breaks my heart. Even
more disturbingly, there is a chance that my lover feels the same. I want the two of us to become
subject together in the eyes of one another. I want to be together, to both be forces in the
subjective realm “It is there that a meaning is put to the test of the present of presence. That it
sets out, progresses, loses its way, changes in order to start again, to return to the crossing where
the other can be encountered. And if the other calls out to me, it is certainly not thanks to naming
that I will succeed in entering into relation with him, or with her.” (Irigaray, 65) I cannot force
my lover’s hand, they must take up being with me of their own volition. Any alternative, would
be cataclysmic. Though part of me might dare to ask how I know that they truly love me as they
claim to or how I know that any of what has begun to deroule between us is anything more than
projection, or even worse, delusion, I have no choice but to take a plunge into the risky and
unsureness. Otherwise, our love can only wilt.
Earlier I noted that the problem of a confession of love is at once a problem of possession
and a problem of language. It seems that language and possession work together, but that does
not mean that new language cannot provide the chance at disentanglement. The Way of Love is a
work that is grounded in discussing the viscous and disorienting problems of love that Nietzsche
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began to lead us through. In it, Luce Irigaray opens up a way towards the heart of the issue. She
takes love as a multipronged problem, not only one of intimacy or sex but one of relation
between two others who have something special and worth preserving in themselves. She is
adept at highlighting the extent to which every other is completely other, and emphasizes that
this difference should not be devalued in relation. However, the knowledge that the other is not
me and I am not them is not enough to solve any of the problems of how we might love each
other. She operates on the assumption, as do I, that much of the problems of love are not some
matter of people not knowing each other well enough, or not caring enough, but perhaps an issue
of where I fail to locate subjectivity in my loved one. This problem of subjectivity is familiar
now, the possessive love of the soul ballad dies on the doorstep of a failed intersubjectivity.
How could I even speak to a new type of love that privileges difference with only the
current language in my repertoire? Might the phrase “I love you” itself, be a reflection of the
avaritic impulses that Nietzsche warns his readers against? The difficulty of these questions is at
the crux of Irigaray’s work. It would seem that there needs to be a linguistic shift to reflect a
conceptual shift about love. It is necessary to find new formulations that recognize the
subjectivity of lovers and conceives of distance as fundamental to preserving this type of
relation. She senses that language cannot capture the expanses of interiority, but she also does
not hold that it should. This is not a limitation to relation, but rather an important feature of what
makes it worth pursuing. Irigaray advocates for love and intimacy because she recognizes that a
robust knowledge of the other inside and out is not impossible but undesirable to begin with.
In her view, what truly allows me to love you or to love my lover or love my mother is
that the rift between us that is teeming with life. It is not a lesion, as I previously diagnosed it,
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but a cornucopia. It pours over with fruit that fuels us as we embark out into an exploration of the
vastness of our relation. She is acutely aware that there is something disturbing about needing to
know everything, about shining a light into every crevasse and peeking over the edge of the
abyss as if the bottom was actually perceptible. There is something artistic about the failure of
language, because when it is used properly it can pave a path for intersubjectivity
“In what way would the word be more appropriate than music or painting? Because it
would escape the objectality of a thing. It would be nothing but an invitation to share. Not yet
closed upon some meaning, but opening from the one to the other -- a between-two. Not due to
some ambiguity but because of the proposal of a communion or a sharing in the sensible
allowing steps toward the transcendental of the difference between.” (Irigaray, 16)
This project is porous and borderless, it is an attempt. I would like to invite you into this practice
alongside me, I am just as sure that at some point I will fail spectacularly.
The betweenness that language can provide must be taken seriously. There are stakes in
an attempt at poetry. Our contemporary language of love constricts me, even prevents me from
the possibility of accessing love as such when I speak of my lover as mine. Irigaray pinpoints the
linguistic cause of this problem as the verb, which “is the world par excellence insofar as it
creates a link, a state, a world… is not emphasized. The verb is acting on the world, the other, the
subject, is not analyzed in its complexity.” (Irigaray, 39) And so, it seems that the language of
love must change in some way to accommodate and recognize the power of verbs in constructing
a divide between subject and object. To fail to do so would be to fail to be serious about the
autonomy of who I love.
To change the way that I speak about love is powerful, not only insofar as it changes the
way I think about the subjects I relate to but because it opens up language as a site of creation.
Language is difficult, to be sure, but there are ways it can be arranged anew and make visible

20

wounds that have not yet been cleaned or inspected. When I change my language, I tend to that
which has been left to rot. By no means is this an easy task
“Being on the way is more dark, more subtle, which is not to say that it will not provide
beacons for other paths. But there paths will not exist without a descent of each one into oneself,
where the body and spirit are still mingled, where the materiality of a breath, of an energy, of a
living being is still virgin, free from information which has already made any approach
impossible.” (Irigaray, 53)
Shifting my language and allowing it to ring out as something important, something with
consequences for how I treat those in my world is an entreatment, an offer, a pilgrimage towards
the possibility for something new.
In an attempt to come up with new ways to express love without leveling or bartering
away interiority, Irigaray formulates “I love to you” as a radical reorientation of the language of
love. I love to you responds where I love you rebuffs. This formulation succeeds insofar as it
recognizes that love is not some transaction nor a mere impression. When I say I love you, I
presuppose some ownership over you, my affections are unidirectional as I act on you. I love you
does not wait for a response. But to say I love to you is to open up a part of myself, I reveal that I
am devoted to you and this devotion is not merely incidental
“In order that the ‘you’ take place in relation with the ‘I,’ the ‘I’ has to secure
faithfulness to its Being in which the other can trust. In the elaboration of its temporality, the ‘I’
must be listening both to the ‘you’ and to the self. Co-propriation in the human necessitates a
dialogue in which the elements remain two - speaking oneself and to the other and listening to
oneself and to the other.” (Irigaray, 82)
Love is no longer a verb that renders you passive, but rather an act that I direct towards you, a
subject in yourself “I love to who you are, to what you do, without reducing you to the object of
my love.” (Irigaray, 60) Importantly this includes the body, and all of its faculties. To love
someone in good faith is to recognize that their subjectivity includes their corporeality.
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I imagine I love to you as a means of preserving the dream that we left not so long ago.
The dream is a risky endeavor, it could be shattered in an instant and yet it continues to live on
despite its precarity. When I love to you, I love to the way you move, the way that I know your
movement is so unlike mine. There is something precarious happening insofar as I cannot know
for sure that you love to my own movements in the same way, but at the same time that exposure
is able to fruitfully prop up the meat of my own declaration. I love to you is not a transaction, it
does not necessarily need to be reciprocated. It is a conscious upholding of “the universality of
dreaming” because it does not seek to impress the love upon the lover, but merely to name the
love and exalt it as such. I love to you is a miraculous reclamation of both myself and my loved
one as subjects, when I love to you we both have a choice. I need not control you to love to you.
Loving to you is not merely a matter of impression, it is a linguistic turn that acknowledges that
affection should be consensual interrelation rather than forcible reciprocation. Irigaray provides a
radical means of thinking through Nietzsche’s problem of conflating love and avarice. She calls
attention to the extent to which truly loving another is to articulate love towards their specificity
and difference.

When Love Turns to Harm
With all of this discussion of love and relation, I would be remiss to fail to mention that
love can turn into something ugly, or that ugliness seems to transform into what we call love.
Harm can be an outcropping of giving a part of oneself over to the other. Just because my love is
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not avartic, it does not protect me from the potentially avaritic impulses of my lover. Surviving
this type of relation can sometimes require some craftiness, some guile. Preserving our love
should not be the chief concern and if I love you, without loving to you, then perhaps our relation
must come to a close. None of us should barter ourselves away for the sake of becoming a
receptacle for the love of the other. I believe there are better options for you and I. Neither of us
should have to become cannibals, gorging ourselves on one another’s flesh for the sake of
achieving some twisted mockery of loving.
Even still, had we not taken a moment to work through Irigaray together, this would not
be so obvious. Dissolution of the self has been taken up as some goal post of love, as soul ballads
so often remind us. But, taking Irigaray and the journey we have taken together seriously, lends
us to approach the issue of harm in the intimate realm seriously. Just because intersubjectivity is
an aim, does not mean that it is a possibility in every case.
Love is not always a romantic whirlwind, nor is it some fairy tale with a clear trajectory.
Love does not always appear monogamous or defined. Not all love is predicated on the act of
confession. Love can be platonic and familial. I invite you to imagine love in whatever way it
appears in your life and to consider how loving to your loved ones rather than impressing love
upon them might change the way you all relate. I do not believe that Irigaray’s formulation is
helpful merely as a guide for romantic love. The tenets of intersubjectivity that she opens up are
markers of seriousness and care that can and should be implemented more broadly. Harm is not
exclusive to romantic relationships, and so neither should possibilities for guarding against it.
Considering I love to you as a vector for a new way of thinking about love that takes up
the lover as a loving subject in their own right rather than a receptacle, has caused me to think
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more critically about the result this shift towards subject/subject relation could have for different
types of relationships that are not necessarily loving in the romantic sense. The schema of
intersubjectivity that she provides could seemingly be extended to intimate life beyond a
pre-established relationship. Perhaps thinking about others in a loving way, without necessarily
considering them to be a lover, could impact the ways that people interact in a more casual
intimate context. People in physically intimate relationships could potentially take up
intersubjectivity as a way of shifting how they conceive of sexual contact for the better.
In the next section, I will be moving away from a discussion of romantic love, but
bringing along the subject/subject relation that Irigaray opened up for us to think about how it
can change the sexual landscape for the better. In an attempt to shed light on the blind spots of
my account thus far, I am going to take us down a path that seeks to consider sexuality when it
may be divorced from love. On my view, her work allows for a confrontation with sexual
violence in a radically new way. Considering that much of the conversation surrounding sex has
become focused on consent in recent years, the interjection of mutually subjective relation as
guiding principle may be helpful in considering new approaches to instances of sexual violence.

Chapter 2: Liberal Consent
Case Studies and Analysis of the #MeToo Movement and Its Conceptual Foundations

Introduction
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With the advent of codified consent, there has been a marked conceptual and social shift
surrounding what exactly consent means and how sexual violence should be regulated. Where
consent was once defined interpersonally, social movements like #MeToo have transformed it
into a broader category that can be publicly arbitrated. The distinction between interpersonal
consent, and this new mode, which I dub liberal consent, lies in the differing approaches to
subjectivity. Liberal consent holds that rights are unalienable, and that institutions can reckon
with any trespassing upon these rights. This is because liberalism conceives of protection of
rights as effectively a protection of subjectivity. However, I argue that is not the case, and it is
necessary to consider the shortcomings of this approach both in regards to protecting survivors
and failing to consider the pre-verbal and corporeal nature of the sexual encounter.
The Antioch code was the first instance of codified consent in the United States, and its
institution generated widespread mockery in the media. It was attacked as reductive, useless, and
draconian while also being out of touch with how young people approach sex along gendered
lines. However, it is now remembered fondly as the founding document in support of affirmative
consent. Since Antioch, the #MeToo movement has arisen and become a repository of the ideals
first expressed and codified in the 1990s. This chapter is a case study of how the #MeToo
movement is a manifestation of the liberal consent model, and the failure of this approach. I hope
to open up the possibility for a way forward, away from the liberal consent model and towards a
model of erotic intersubjective relation.
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A Brief History Lesson
RAINN, America’s largest anti-sexual violence organization, defines consent as follows
“Consent is an agreement between participants to engage in sexual activity. Consent should be
clearly and freely communicated. A verbal and affirmative expression of consent can help both
you and your partner to understand and respect each other’s boundaries.” I agree wholeheartedly
that this description of consent should be the standard for any type of sexual relationship.
Consent is categorically virtuous and is a protective measure for the welfare of those involved in
an encounter.
This evaluation of consent is useful insofar as it describes something particular about
sexual context on an interpersonal basis, people can use this definition to guide the ways that
they interact with one another or describe the qualities of a sexual interaction to their friends. To
be able describe an encounter as consensual or non-consensual in the personal realm is a helpful
faculty. However, consent and questions about its limitations are not merely interpersonal, there
are institutional, juridical, and political demands that weigh on a term that cannot carry the
weight. To transmute the term “consent” from an interpersonal to a political and institutional tool
is to dishonor the intricacies and specificities of what makes an act consensual. This is because
institutions are not subjects, they are not capable of sparking the subject/subject relation that is
required to gain and enforce a standard of consent. As a result, consent as something that is
publically arbitrated takes on a liberal quality in that “liberalism has taken it for granted that
protecting rights is a sufficient guarantee for the primacy of individual subjectivity.” (Santoro, 2)
The use of consent in a liberal institutional framework fails to take into account that there are
differences in the subjective experiences and the retention of rights for those within the confines
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of an institution that does not seek to protect them is not a given. From here on, I am going to
draw on this distinction between consent and liberal consent as a means of teasing out the
failures on the liberal consent model.
In 1991, Antioch college was undergoing a serious transition that fundamentally changed
the way colleges across America and their students engaged with questions of sexual violence
and consent. The student group Womyn of Antioch banded together to draft guidelines about
sexual encounters in response to two sexual assaults on the small campus within a single
semester. The code was groundbreaking for a number of reasons, not only was it the first of its
kind in the history of a modern university but it shifted the focus of conversation around consent
entirely. Kristine Herman, a member of the student group remarked in an interview with NPR
“You know, it listed the idea that you have to get verbal and willing agreement to engaging in
any sexual contact. This was a huge, fundamental shift in defining what consent means. And
always, the conversation around consent has focused on, does someone say no. And so at
Antioch we really focused on defining consent in a very different way and asking a very different
question, which is did somebody say yes?” The concept of orienting consent around willful
agreement has since been dubbed affirmative consent. The Antioch code paved the way for what
is now the standard for the way colleges and universities speak and teach about consent, though
at the time the code was mocked for its perceived utopianism and lack of understanding of the
conventions of sexual contact. Nevertheless, codes like the one implemented at Antioch have
become the norm:
Consent:
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Consent is defined as the act of willingly and verbally agreeing to engage in specific sexual
conduct. The following are clarifying points:

●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

●
●

Consent is required each and every time there is sexual activity.
All parties must have a clear and accurate understanding of the sexual activity.
The person(s) who initiate(s) the sexual activity is responsible for asking for consent.
The person(s) who are asked are responsible for verbally responding.
Each new level of sexual activity requires consent.
Use of agreed upon forms of communication such as gestures or safe words is acceptable,
but must be discussed and verbally agreed to by all parties before sexual activity occurs.
Consent is required regardless of the parties’ relationship, prior sexual history, or current
activity (e.g. grinding on the dance floor is not consent for further sexual activity).
At any and all times when consent is withdrawn or not verbally agreed to, the sexual
activity must stop immediately.
Silence is not consent.
Body movements and non-verbal responses such as moans are not consent.
A person can not give consent while sleeping.
All parties must have unimpaired judgement (examples that may cause impairment
include but are not limited to alcohol, drugs, mental health conditions, physical health
conditions).
All parties must use safer sex practices.
All parties must disclose personal risk factors and any known STIs. Individuals are
responsible for maintaining awareness of their sexual health.

These requirements for consent do not restrict with whom the sexual activity may occur, the type
of sexual activity that occurs, the props/toys/tools that are used, the number of persons involved,
the gender(s) or gender expressions of persons involved.
The model developed by the Womyn of Antioch in the 1990s is one that privileges the
safety of sexual subjects by creating conditions wherein they are able to create frameworks of
interpersonal responsibility within the sexual realm. It is not a puritan statement about what types
of sex can take place, but instead an approach that seeks to shed light on the blindspots that lead
to nonconsensual interactions.
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The Antioch code was broadly mocked and criticized by the media at the time of its
inception. There was uproar about the perceived lack of realism, as well as the consequences that
could accompany a breach of the code. Saturday Night Live, of course, weighed in running a skit
on the subject. The stage was made up as a set for the fictional game show “Is It Date Rape,”
featuring two contestants in the form of a stereotypical fraternity brother and a demure young
woman. The fraternity brother, Mark, is a collage of all of the traits one thinks of when they
think of controversies that have spawned out of fraternities in recent years, having “ been
charged in three hazing deaths...with two counts of hate speech, and one instance of sexual
harassment when you referred to the women’s field hockey teams as, “a bunch of lezbos.””
While the young woman, Ariel, “is our defending champion, she’s a Junior and a major in
Victimization Studies.” She is the stand-in for the cultural imagination of who would be
interested in making a code on consent in the 1990s, coded as a no-nonsense feminist type who is
detatched from sexual reality. The game is premised on making each of the contestants decide
whether specific instances constitute date rape. The joke being that the young man always said
“no” while the young woman always said “yes,” highlighting at once the boorishness of young
men in fraternities and their notorious culture of date rape while at once mocking the prudishness
of the professional managerial minded young women that are their peers.
This skit brings something interesting into view, it is as though the two young people
competing are operating in totally different sexual realms without any unifying logic for
demarcating the limits of what can be consensual sex. The frat boy serves as a vessel for the
“boys will be boys” model, that assumes men are incapable of understanding the intricacies of
consensual sex and rely on their basest instincts to guide them. More broadly, his lack of care for
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the changing societal norms of the 90s is obvious, and manifests in harmful ways. He argues at
one point during the skit that spending $40 on a date’s dinner is grounds for her to reciprocate his
sexual advances. Inversely, the young woman is presented as hyper aware of the nuances of
consent, to the extent that she qualifies most things as date rape, divorced from context
“ [ curtain parts to reveal the two players in a scene together ]
Male Date Rape Player #2: I sure had a nice time at that ragin’ kegger. May I kiss you on the
mouth.
Female Date Rape Player #2: Yes. Kissing me on the mouth.. is something I feel..
com-fort-a-ble with. [ they kiss on the mouth ] Mmmm.. that.. was nice!
Male Date Rape Player #2: Would you mind if we had sexual intercourse?
Female Date Rape Player #2: No… [ Ariel buzzes in ]
Dean Frederick Whitcomb: Helpern-Strauss?
Ariel Helpern-Strauss: Date Rape! No always means no!
Dean Frederick Whitcomb: That’s correct! Good job, Ariel! A bit of a trick question there!”

The anxiety and hypervigilance of the young woman opposes the permissiveness and
insensitivity of the young man, which in the end exposes them both as inept sexual subjects.
Ariel Halpern-Strauss is operating on the basis of hard and fast rules. The contextual and
linguistic cues that define the nature of a sexual encounter are lost on her. Mark Stobel’s
character is framed as unaware and stupid, but fundamentally his character represents the
insidious nature of concieving of sex as a transactional site. Neither could possibly understand
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the plethora of cues (both physical and linguistic) than can arise and confirm or deny that sexual
contact is consensual.
The conceptual schism that is highlighted here, though exaggerated, is not fictional. The
mocking bit does expose something interesting, in that cultural moment it may have felt like
there was no alternative between the sexual ideology of the frat bro and the bookish young
woman. There is a clear need to strike some type of balance between these two points of view, in
a way that takes seriously the potential for sexual violence that women very accutely feel while
simultaneously not projecting puritanical rites into sexual exploits. The New York Times
coverage of the institution of the Antioch code and the cultural response ‘Ask First’ At Antioch
rightfully points out that the codification of consent “is fertile ground for misunderstandings
galore. One person's mutuality, even simultaneity, can often be another person's submission.”
(Times, 1993) The confusing and risky nature of sex itself can not be totally governed, and even
in cases where the code is followed to a T, there is the possibility for people to feel wronged and
violated. The Times coverage emphasizes that despite all efforts, young people can still cause
lasting harm to one another, by way of their own lack of experience and immaturity
“Adolescents will always make mistakes -- sometimes serious ones. Telling them what's
unacceptable, in no uncertain terms, is fine. But legislating kisses won't save them from
themselves.” (Times, 1993)
This sentiment is still alive and well, particularly amongst older feminists who are
suspicious of the agential repercussions that inadvertently crop up as a result of the broad
institution of codes of consent. Initially, the Antioch code was a student-led initiative that seeked
to implement preventative measures to lessen instances of date rape on their campus. This is
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markedly different from the now-ubiquitous student pledges and trainings surround sexual
violence prevention. Importantly, as these harm-reduction efforts have become commonplace,
rates of sexual assault on college campuses have not decreased in turn. Why? Notably, Camille
Paglia the art historian, cultural critic, and antifeminist has been concerned with questions about
campus culture and sexual assault. She espouses that the predominant force of liberal feminism
has sanitized sexual relation rather that cracking it open, and fails to teach young people about
what she understands to be the reality of sex, that “aggression and eroticism, in fact, deeply
intertwined.” (Paglia, 2014) She is unconvinced by the predominant narratives liberal feminists
have built about sexuality since the sexual revolution, as am I.
Much of her work regarding sex is based in her charge that as a society we have
abandoned “sizzle,” the ineffable passion and heat that makes sex an escstatic experience, for the
sake of propping up safe sex
“Neither militant feminism, which is obsessed with politically correct language, nor academic
feminism, which believes that knowledge and experience are “constituted by” language, can
understand pre-verbal or nonverbal communication. Feminism, focusing on sexual politics,
cannot see that exists in and through the body. Sexual arousal and desire cannot be fully
translated into verbal terms.” (Paglia, 2014)
Her notion of sizzle is inherently tied to risk. There cannot be sizzle without the possibility of
danger, the spectre of uncanniness that lurks in the background of sexual interaction is what
makes sex what it is.
Further, sexuality is a site of play and acts can remain inscrutable despite communication.
Slavoj Zizek’s employs a scene from Sex and the City to get at this limitation.
“Although I am not a fan of Sex and the City, there is an interesting point made in one of the
episodes where Miranda gets involved with a guy who likes to talk dirty all the time during sex.
Since she prefers to keep silent while making love, he solicits her to also say whatever dirty
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things pop up in her mind, with no restraint. At first, she resists, but then she also gets caught in
this game, and things work well: their sex is intense and passionate, until… until she says
something that really disturbs her lover, makes him totally withdraw into himself, and leads to
the break of their relationship. In the middle of her babble, she mentions that she noticed how he
enjoys it when, while he makes love to her, she pushes her finger into his ass. Unknowingly, she
thereby touches the exception: yes, talk about anything you want, spill out all the dirty images
that pop up in your head, except that. The lesson of this incident is important: even the
universality of talking freely is based on some exception, not on the sense of extreme brutality.
The prohibited detail is in itself a minor and rather innocent thing, and we can only guess why
the guy is so sensitive about it. In all probability, the passive experience it involved (anal
penetration) disturbs his masculine identification. Sexual interplay is full of such exceptions
where a silent understanding and tact offer the only way to proceed when one wants things done
but not explicitly spoken about, when extreme emotional brutality can be enacted in the guise of
politeness, and when moderate violence itself can get sexualized.” (Zizek, 2018)
There is a trap in believing that merely communicating verbally can capture all of the
psychic and unconscious baggage that accompanies sexual contact. People’s sexual modes are
not unidirectionally constituted, and violence does not look one way. This is not to say that no
good has come from the movement, or that there are not many cases that genuinely should be
treated as sexually violent. But that #MeToo’s ethos can also be a vehicle for erasure
“The problem is not that #MeToo goes too far, sometimes approaching a witch hunt, and
that more moderation and understanding are needed, but the way #MeToo addresses the issue. In
downplaying the complexity of sexual interactions, it not only blurs the line between lewd
misconduct and criminal violence but also masks invisible forms of extreme psychological
violence as politeness and respect.” (Zizek, 2018)
Sexual harm should not be taken as a fact of life and evacuated from discourse, there is
an importance in recognizing that to be in an intimate relation as sexual subjects is to take up the
responsibility that consent requires. The belief that sexual safety can be adjudicated and agreed
upon by society at large is not only unrealistic, but makes it hard for young people to
conceptualize themselves as sexual subjects who are responsible for one another. Paglia is right,
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on my view, to question if mythologies about safe sex and the constant emphasis on liberal
consent might be doing is pushing sexual subjects away from one another.
The implementation of liberal sexual codification has been treated as the only necessary
safe-guard against sexual violence. This is not sufficient, and relies on the liberal imagination
that merely naming a problem could destroy it. By teaching young people about consent as an
institutional expectation that can be arbitrated and punished rather than an interpersonal standard
that makes sex better, our society is inadvertently orienting sexual violence as another societal
norm that can be transgressed so long as the event is not exposed. Importantly, sexual assault
training and drug and alcohol trainings are lumped together, sending the message that
experimenting with drugs and alcohol as an adolescent could be equated with violating another
person sexually. Our institutions must move beyond legislating kisses, and towards a focus on
bridging the linguistic and phenomenological gaps that have been established along gendered
lines in the post-Antioch era.
Taking seriously the problem of sexual violence requires a shift away from liberal
consent which is more concerned with language than materiality. Funnily enough, second wave
feminist and notorious transphobe Germaine Greer’s argument that “rape is a hate crime, not a
sex crime” (Greer, 69) does a better job at acutely diagnosing the underlying problem of sexual
violence on campuses than conventional liberal feminist slogans do. So long as the frat boy
ideology that SNL diagnoses persists, that women and other gender minorities are a means to an
end rather than fully rounded people with interiority and feelings, sexual violence will persist.
And the law and institutions will continue to fail survivors of sexual violence, despite the
establishment of rules that are meant to operate as protective measures. The examination of
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another, more recent, case of uproar surrounding sexual violence could allow another point of
incision into understanding and deconstructing the fundamentally liberal impulses that govern
the current discourse on sexuality and violence.

#MeToo’s Bourgeois Feminism
The #MeToo movement of the late 2010s was globally heralded as turning point in how
issues of sexual assault were confronted. Sparked by people sharing their stories of abuse on the
internet, tagged with #MeToo, the movement shifted the public discourse towards the recognition
that sexual violence is not some rarity but an all too common fact of life for a vast swath of the
population. With this reality laid bare for the general population to contend with, celebrities and
common people alike began to expose their abusers in a public forum in an attempt to hold them
accountable for the harms they perpetrated. Consent shifted from a conceptual framework about
how sexual partners might interact but instead a rallying call for a broader upheaval against a
culture that fails to protect victims and protects abusers on all levels of society. However, this
moment was polyphonic in nature, not everyone was convinced of the movement’s good faith
and its efficacy in achieving its goal of exposing and punishing those who committed sexually
violent acts.
Critics of #MeToo often have multipronged critiques, but for the most part there are a few
dominant narratives on the left about why the public arbitration model of the #MeToo era is not
helpful in helping those most vulnerable to sexual and interpartner violence. The first critique
was in regards to the lack of recognition of the origins of the movement. MeToo was first coined
in 2006 by activist Tarana Burke, as a slogan for a campaign to raise awareness about violence
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against black, working class women. The term was reappropriated in the late 2010s in a way that
expanded the realm of concern beyond the original subjects and rebranded as a universal rallying
cry. For some black feminist scholars, the highjacking of Burke’s expression was representative
of broader failures of the #MeToo movement, insofar as it is an expression of “Bourgeois
feminisms [that] go to significant trouble to construct a critique of workplace abuse that keeps
raced and classed hierarchy intact.” (Berg, 261)
The material considerations that color instances of workplace violence fell by the
wayside as media zeroed in on celebrity accounts of sexual assault and harrassment as the main
concern of the movement. Working class women are most vulnerable to workplace abuse, and
sexual abuse in general, and yet the #MeToo movement was by and large focused on wealthy
white women and their experiences. Heather Berg argues in her work Left of #MeToo that this
focus was not accidental or merely the result of media maneuvering, but rather a calculated
choice by the figureheads of the movement “To make this possible, bourgeois feminism
advocates an exceptionalizing approach, one that imagines sexuality as the only vulnerability
worth protecting.”(Berg, 262) Exploitation, in this model, has only one dimension. To be
exploited or victimized at work becomes a direct result of patriarchal control of women and the
sexual violence that results from it. #MeToo never seeked to consider whether the true problem
at hand was one of capitalist exploitation of the workplace being extended to the bodies of the
workers themselves. Instead of using the movement to highlight the racial and class dimensions
of sexual violence and abuse, they weaponized their own experiences to obfuscate how power
determines availability for abuse. The movement took the approach that implied sexual violence
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can equally effect everyone regardless of class or race, when in actuality the experiences of
abuse by those most vulnerable to it fell on deaf ears.
The sexual politics of the movement seem to undermine women’s sexual autonomy. In
the bourgeois feminist schema, to be thrust into the sexual realm at the workplace is the most
fundamental violation of personhood possible regardless of whether this sexual experience is
negative or not. #MeToo seeks to interpret all workplace sexual activity as exploitative without
taking into account that “the frame that “sees women as objects of sexualized male
domination”— encourages conservative policing of sexuality “Sometimes what we want is not
fully known to us in advance,” she warns, and suggests that sexuality’s radical potential lies at
least in part in that liminality.” (Berg, 265) The focus of the #MeToo movement became power
imbalances in the workplace in a way that assumes there could never be something to be gained
from entering in sexual relationships with colleagues or superiors, it was merely cast as coercion
for the sake of itself “Not all seemingly consensual transactions are free of coercion, of course. A
common mistake of philosophical liberalism (and some sex positive feminism) is to presume that
any exchange arises out of, and generates, symmetry between two actors. But transacting in sex,
or getting something in exchange for sex, does not mean that coercion is absent. In fact, coercion
can also work in seemingly consensual ways.” (Tambe, 200) This leaves out the possibility for
choice and sexual autonomy, there is a long history of women using sex as a means of gaining
security, and this fact is erased in the context of #MeToo because the bourgeois feminists who
the movement best serve are already secure. “To make this possible, bourgeois feminism
mobilizes the specter of sex work as the threat awaiting all working women — to be sexualized
at work is to be rendered a prostitute, and legitimate working women need protection from this
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category error.” (Berg, 262) For working class women, sexual exchange can be the only means
of advancement. This is not merely the result of some amorphous patriarchy. In actuality, it is the
byproduct of a hierarchical capitalist system that produces precarious conditions for workers,
who in turn must creatively interpolate sexuality in order to either maintain or improve their
material realities.
Paradoxically, many of the women who became the public face of #MeToo admitted that
they acquiesced to sexual interactions that they later felt were coerced, in order to advance their
careers. Only after they came to enjoy the status, wealth, and protection that their ascension
afforded were they able to reframe these instances as sexually violent. Without the protection and
inalienability that class privilege affords, these women would not have been able to openly tell
their stories. Nor would they have been able to seek punishment for the men they came to
recognize as their abusers. With the reinsertion of class into the reading of #MeToo, one can
come to understand that “the realities of workplace sexuality demand a dialectical frame that
understands it as something we struggle with and over, not a point of vulnerability for which we
need protection or a point of pleasure we need the liberty to pursue. This stands in sharp contrast
to dominance feminist thinking on sexual harassment at work.” (Berg, 266)
Daniel Loick’s work “...as if there were such a thing.” A Feminist Critique of Consent
employs a watershed moment in the #MeToo movement in order to reflect on the limitations of
liberal consent to account for the messiness of sexual encounters. In 2018, during arguably the
most explosive moment of powerful people being exposed for predatory behavior, an anomaly
appeared. Up to this moment, those being deplatformed by the movement were commensurable
to the public standard of a rapist or abuser. However, when an anonymous account was published
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online about an uncomfortable encounter that took place between a woman using the pseudonym
“Grace” and Aziz Ansari the well-known comedian, it sparked concerns and critiques about what
genuinely constituted a non-consensual sexual experience. This case was not so cut and dry as
that of the serial rapist and Hollywood executive Harvey Weinstein. Instead, it led to serious
concerns about how far the cultural movement would extend the conventional definitions of
sexual assault and consent.
Based on Grace’s own account, she went on a date with Ansari and later went home with
him. At one point she voiced her discomfort which, in effect, ended the encounter and Grace
returned home upset. The next day the two texted and Ansari apologized for making her
uncomfortable. For some in the media, this was merely an unfortunate instance of
miscommunication while others scorned the comedian as an assaulter. This case reflects the
tricky problem that is consent, on one hand Grace’s discomfort should not be dismissed but
neither should Ansari’s retraction in the moment and later apology. Loick uses this controversy
as a jumping off point for his critique of consent as such a thing in public imagination
“What both sides of the debate have in common is that they juxtapose violence and
consent: the sexual encounter between Grace and Ansari was either consensual or violent. The
problem with this dichotomy, however, is that cases like this one prove that social interactions
can be consensual and still be violent; in other words; that the category of (non-)consent is not
adequate to describe the wrong that has been done here. The Ansari case indicates there are at
least five initial problems with the concept of consent:

1. Temporality: sometimes we initially agree to something only to realize later that we were
uncomfortable with or that a boundary was crossed.
2. Inconsistency: sometimes we want different or contradictory things at once and thus have
to suppress parts of our own subjectivity in order to represent one single unified will.
3. Opacity: sometimes we don’t have access to our desires or don't know what we do (and
don’t) want.

39

4. Asymmetry: agreements take place under unequal conditions, where one party might
accept a proposal out of admiration (as a fan), pressure, or fear of negative consequences.
5. Partiality: agreement often means accepting a given yes-or-no option, without being able
to shape or co-determine the larger context of the interaction.
None of these five problems curtails the juridical validity of a consent given, yet they can lead to
a situation where even consensual interaction can still be experienced as violent.” (Loick, 2)

The Ansari affair highlights that there are limitations to how to approach questions of
consent, in so far as it departs from conventions of what is generally considered sexual violence.
Further it highlights that liberal consent is focused on subjects in a binary structure wherein they
are either aggressed or aggressor, the victim or the perpetrator “this general dynamic has highly
gender-specific effects: It requires women to abandon habitual dispositions formed through their
everyday life experiences and to inhabit the domain of contractual reason (Brown, 1995, p.184),
while it contributes to the creation of a sense of entitlement in men, encouraging them to reject
all forms of responsibilities towards other that they have not voluntarily agreed to, thus denying
any form of pre-established dependency and interconnectedness.” (Loick, 6) The simplifying and
binarizing effects of liberal consent are only helpful insofar as it allows for simple mythologies
to be constructed about what sexual harm looks like and what type of person does such a thing.
As a result, any experiences that fail to fit into this normative story are rendered abject along
with the intricacies of the reality of sexual harm. Rather than conceiving of adults as by in large
people capable of taking on responsibility for one another as sexual agents, men are once more
granted total subjectivity while women are merely granted the possibility to acquiesce. This
dichotomy not only leaves out gender minorities but also effectively reifies gendered norms of
activity and passivity.
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“the contractualist notion of consent as a cultural norm creates individualized realms of actions
that are mutually repellent. It requires people engaging in sexual activities to abstract from their
concrete, often contradictory or ambivalent emotions and affects and to reinterpret them in light
of a disembodied proto-juridical normative framework. It thereby fosters a solipsistic pursuit of
one’s own sexual interests and thus a merely strategic relationship towards the other, rather than
a dynamic communication about desires, needs, and fears. This individualization not only
undermines the communicative substance of intimate relationships, it also tends to depoliticize
sexuality by treating it as the result of private worlds who voluntarily exchange goods.” (Loick,
7)
This capitalist system of exchange has no choice but to self-cannibalize. The lack of
critical thinking on the part of liberal feminists creates an accidental feedback loop that is
antithetical to their purported goal of attaining gender equity. Sex positivity, a radical feminist
movement that seeks to redistribute sexual power to those who have been disempowered by
legacies of white supremacist patriarchy, has been coopted by liberal feminists as a reincarnation
of the Free Love and women’s movements of the 1970s. The originators of the sex positive
movement seeked to emphasize the extent to which sexual disempowerment was a problem
grounded in lack of agency and prescriptive sexual mythologies. However, the liberal feminist
framework fundamentally cannot bear the weight of such a radical prescription. Instead, in an
attempt to free women from the structures which inflict sexual harm on them and remove their
agency, they reconstruct these same norms and adorn them with a pussy hat. Despite
conversations about sexual violence and interpersonal consent becoming more common, sexual
assault rates have not been decreasing in turn. There is a definitive gap between the liberal
imaginary that simply naming a problem and instituting juridical framework will eventually
solve it and the actuality that sex remains something like unspeakable.
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There is something insidiously puritanical about the account of sexuality that is built into
the liberal feminism of the #MeToo movement. Rather than focusing on the structural nature of
sexual violence, the use of individual narratives builds up an account that levels the possibility
for women to recognize they can use their sexual power for their own advacement. For those
without institutional backing or wealth, there are relatively few ways for women to advance
themselves. #MeToo conflates this bartering within a system which confines women and limits
their opportunities with sexual violence for the sake of itself.
Consent must be reconceptualized. The failure of the liberal institutional model to protect
those most vulnerable to sexual violence is not a flaw but rather a feature of its construction.
Privileging the bourgeois feminist account of sexual assault falls short, there must be more
creative solutions that center the autonomy of sexual subjects. Language must play a part in this
restructuring, alongside a more robust understanding of what consensual sex means and what it
might look like. If we hold that risk is inherent to sexual relation, we must create frameworks
and privilege sex education that does not treat sexual harm as the organizing feature of sexual
life while simultaneously not treating survivors as collateral.
Reflecting on specific instances that define the discourse surrounding sexual violence in
the post-Antioch era highlights a number of problems that I would like to take a moment to
clearly define.
1. Liberalism conceives of legal and institutional recognition of the problem of
sexual violence as adequate to limit further instances of this violence. Codes of
consent, which have become ubiquitous, do not inherently prevent people from
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being sexually harmed, even if they are adhered to down to the letter. Feelings of
violation cannot always be captured or processed in a given moment.
2. Consensual sex, as imagined by the liberal, does not always constitute good sex
but must appear to be a non-transactional sexual relation. Capitalism can put
women and gender minorities in positions where sexual exchange can be a means
to an end without necessarily feeling violating. Allowing liberal consent to govern
sexual interaction alone depoliticizes the power imbalances that are implicit in
sexual relation.
3. Liberal consent takes sexual dogma as a given, rather than attempting to
deconstruct sexual mythologies it relies on them to justify itself. This can serve to
reduce sex to either a succesful contractual exchange or a ravaging, reinforcing
masculinity as the primary site of subjectivity.
Approaching the obstacles of liberal consent in an attempt to remedy them is no simple
task. The difficulty with human sexuality lies in the complexity of the nature of interpersonal
relation. However, these are not problems that can be set aside or ignored. To do so would be to
fall into the same trap as the liberal feminists, naming the problems is not enough. I would like to
provide opportunities for looking at sex in a way that may allow for genuine negotiation between
sexual actors, that can allow for a way towards perhaps suturing the experiential divide between
subjects that operate along gendered lines. Further, I would like to spend time thinking critically
about how Irigaray’s framework of intersubjective relation could serve to prevent sexual violence
and provide greater opportunities for a new type of relation that privileges subjectivity.
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Chapter 3: The Great Eros
Confronting Liberal Consent and Deploying the Intersubjective Relational Model

Introduction
Shifting conversations about sexual exploitation away from liberal feminist dogma
requires a conceptual relocation of power. I rebuke any feminism that relies on individualization
and binaries to substantiate itself. I rebuke any feminism that takes people being rendered abject
and left behind as a feature of society that cannot be changed. I take seriously the possibility for
a better world, and I dare to imagine myself in it. I pray that you may be able to imagine yourself
in a new world too. In this section, I would like to continue to think about liberal consent
critically but through the conceptual lens that is eroticism.
Audre Lorde defines eroticism as a uniquely feminine force, born of chaos, which affirms
life and subjectivity and can be harnessed to political ends. This lifeblood has been suppressed
for patriarchal ends, and has been purposefully discursively reconstructed as indistinguishable
from pornography. Lorde holds that, in fact, pornography and eroticism are oppugnant. Where
eroticism can be used to cultivate knowledge and sensation, pornography is suppressive and
deterministic. Deploying this distinction, I argue that the liberal consent that #MeToo explifies, is
a pornographic conceptual framework which fails to account for the feeling and agency of
women. Further, I would like to position eroticism as the lynchpin of new possibilities for
addressing sexual vulnerability in a polyphonic way. Irigaray’s intersubjectivity returns as a
means of thinking through the prescriptions of erotic power. In order to meaningfully confront

44

the worries I have with the liberal consent model, I take up the intersubjective charges of erotic
power as a means of forging a path forward.

Eroticism vs. Pornification
Audre Lorde, the black feminist thinker and poet, brilliantly constructs a materialist
feminist critique that hinges on her notion of the erotic. For Lorde, eroticism is a site of power
that is distinctly feminine in nature, it “is a resource within each of us that lies in a deeply female
and spiritual plane, firmly rooted in the power of our unexpressed or unrecognized feeling.”
(Lorde, 1) The erotic is a conceptual framework that allows women, particularly black lesbian
women (as they are Lorde’s primary audience across her body of work), to reclaim power on
both a political and sensual level. She argues that the erotic has been disempowered in western
society, “we have been taught to suspect this resource, vilified, abused, and devalued” (Lorde, 1)
because this force is fully actualized it has the potential to challenge the oppressive frameworks
that are required in order for heteropatriarchal capitalism to continue to perpetuate itself. When
women are alienated from their eroticism, they are rendered more available for exploitation and
“are maintained at a distant/inferior positions to be psychically milked, much the same way ants
maintain colonies of aphids to provide a life-giving substance for their masters.” (Lorde, 1)
However, the erotic is a renewable resource, despite the way society seeks to repress it, it is the
lifeblood of feminine life.
Lorde distinguishes the erotic from the pornographic, though the two are often
colloquially treated as interchangaeable. Lorde describes the pornographic as the opposite of the
erotic, it is “ a direct denial of the power of the erotic, for it represents the suppression of true
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feeling. Pornography emphasizes sensation without feeling.” (Lorde, 2) Pornification’s confusion
with the erotic does not come as an accident. Lorde argues that it is a purposeful move by
patriarchal forces to denigrate and obscure the source of power that is the erotic. Pornography
has implications, and is situated in the masculine realm. Recently, more and more pornography
depicts the abuse and objectification of women. Patriarchy brilliantly conceals the erotic and its
potential under the sign of ultimate conquering and control of women.
The erotic represents a radical depth of feeling and a taking up of self-responsibility, but
when it is subsumed under pornification there are serious sexual consequences as a result
“On the one hand, the superficially erotic has been encouraged as a sign of female
inferiority; on the other hand, women have been made to suffer and to feel both contemptible and
suspect by virtue of its existence. It is a short step from there to the false belief that only by the
suppression of the erotic within our lives and consciousness can women be truly strong. But that
strength is illusory, for it is fashioned within the context of male models of power.” (Lorde, 1)
The pornographic is a sterilizing force that fails to do the important work of extrapolating the act
of sex and its possibilities beyond itself. It is not aspirational or reflexive and instead is a means
of weaponizing sexuality and investigation of erotic power against women “The erotic has often
been misnamed by men and used against women.” (Lorde, 2) The patriarchal move of
intentionally constructing eroticism as pornography has, in effect, stigmatized any taking-up of
sexual power and autonomy by women and gender minorities. In effect, for a non-man to take up
the erotic as a source of their power and wield it as a site of knowledge and self-assurance has
been constructed as “the confused, the trivial, the psychotic, the plasticized sensation.” (Lorde, 2)
Without the ability to access the erotic, agency and subjectivity cannot be actualized to its fullest
extent. In order to begin to think about sex outside of the binary structures built into liberal
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consent, I find it necessary to privilege the erotic as an organizing force that should be tapped
back into to find new ways of approaching sexuality.

Liberal Consent as Pornification
The issues I map out with liberal consent, I believe, are reducible as modalities of the
pornification that Lorde indicts as an affront to erotic power. Approaching the points that I made
at the end of the last chapter through a Lordeian lens that defines pornification as the opposite of
the erotic, I will demonstrate the extent to which the results of liberal consent are a direct result
of erotic repression.
Liberal consent relies on legal and structural frameworks as the safeguards for the sexual
realm. Sexual violence is named, and then recognized as a specifically legal concern. Justice is
served when an abuser is indicted (which happens so rarely), how naive it is to assume that this
could do something like allow for a survivor of sexual violence to begin to heal or be restored in
this model. Further, institutional protection is afforded to few among us as is distributed along
classed, raced, and gendered lines. Lorde’s work is clear about how the institution is primarily
interested in erotic repression, but how is the liberal privileging of legal frameworks
demonstrative of a pornified culture?
Keeping in mind that the pornographic, for Lorde, is the opposite of the erotic, I propose
that the insitutional model of approaching sexual violence is tantamount to what Lorde describes
as “living outwards.” This phenomena is a direct result of erotic repression that serves to
estrange women from understanding their own needs for the sake of conforming to dogmatic
forms of emotional expression
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“When we live outside ourselves, and by that I mean on external directives only rather
than from our internal knowledge and needs, when we live away from those erotic guides from
within ourselves, then our lives are limited by external and alien forms, and we conform to the
needs of a structure that is not based on human need, let alone an individual's.” (Lorde, 3)
The emphasis on naming instances of sexual violence is reflective of a conceptual framework
which does not seek to attend to human need.
The Ansari affair attests to the serious repercussions that can accompany a culture which
privileges living outward. The media’s obsessive belaboring on whether the sexual contact
between Ansari and Grace was consensual or not totally failed to consider the extent to which
naming and shaming the events accordingly would not change what happened between the two
of them. The night that Ansari and Grace spent together was uncomfortable for her, and she
should not have been turned into a figure in a broader culture war. Many people accused her of
seeking attention or clout by sharing her story, when fundamentally
“The need for sharing deep feeling is a human need. But within the European-American
tradition, this need is satisfied by certain proscribed erotic comings-together. These occasions are
almost always characterized by a simultaneous looking away, a pretense of calling them
something else, whether a religion, a fit, mob violence, or even playing doctor. And this
misnaming of the need and the deed give rise to that distortion which results in pornography and
obscenity—the abuse of feeling.” (Lorde, 7)
In effect, the pornified nature of this facet of liberal consent lies in the underlying assumption
that feeling is not central to human life, “it represents the suppression of true feeling.”(Lorde,1).
The legal system does not seek to approach the emotional reality of the survivors it so often fails.
Nor can the mere naming of an event as sexually violent atone for that violence.
In the liberal consent model, consensual sex does not always mean good sex, and good
sex is not an aim or an end goal. This is inherent pornified because not uplifting good sex and the
feelings it generates as a goal conceptually alienates sex from its somatic nature, therefore
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downplaying the fundamentally erotic nature of feeling. The pornographic nature of the liberal
emphasis on non-coercive sex (...as if there were such a thing) lies in the notion that sex could
ever be entirely symmetrical in a society which is intrinsically hierarchical. Asymmetry is a
feature of sexual life because it is a feature of life in general, but the liberal feminist imaginary
that sex is the chief site of coercion fails to understand the world for what it is.
Bourgeois feminism is propagated by women who view sexuality as their only
vulnerability, but for so many other subjects sexuality is one of the only realms where they have
power and agency. This agency is built into the erotic model, which demands that women truly
evaluate their actions on the basis of their own positions and place in the world “Our erotic
knowledge empowers us, becomes a lens through which we scrutinize all aspects of our
existence, forcing us to evaluate those aspects honestly in terms of the irrelative meaning within
our lives.” (Lorde, 5) The creative negotiation that sometimes happen in sex, ist not necessarily
always unconsensual so much as it is an expression of erotic power, an “assertion of the life
force of women; of that creative energy empowered, the knowledge and use of which we are now
reclaiming in our language, our history, our dancing, our loving, our work, our lives.” (Lorde, 6)
The contractual nature of liberal consent reinforces masculine subjectivity by reinforcing
the taught notions that some never unlearn. Our society constructs women as prey, people readily
available for domination, and the codes of consent that have become all too common fail to
recognize that so much of sexual life hinges on that false pretense. A pledge in a school
handbook or a virtual work training cannot change the mythology that determines the boundaries
of sexual imagination. Rather than attempting to beat back underlying assumptions that govern
who can be granted full sexual subjectivity, liberal consent leaves these dogmas uninterrogated.
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While the erotic advocates for an exploration of sexual roles in an attempt to find a mode of
operation that feels right, the pornographic nature of liberal consent builds a shrine at the feet of
the plasticized body of woman. All ye that trespass against her must sign a contract to that effect.
We are all independent contractors after all.

Hello Again
I have not forgotten about you, my dear reader. I have missed you immensely. I apologize
for my digression away from our tête-à-tête. This whole work is about the interplay between you
and me, after all. Our time together is drawing to a close, though I have no doubt we will see
each other soon enough. Now is the part where I can tie all of what we have done here together,
bring it all to bear. I have framed the model of liberal consent as pornographic, but I have not
made it explicitly clear why that is dangerous. The hazard of the pornographic is that it creates a
framework of subject/object relation, one that incentivizes subjects to
“use each other as objects of satisfaction rather than share our joy in the satisfying, rather than
make connection with our similarities and our differences.To refuse to be conscious of what we
are feeling at the time, however comfortable that might seem, is to deny a large part of the
experience, and to allow ourselves to be reduced to the pornographic, the abused and the
absurd.” (Lorde, 8)
When I turn away from the erotic, I turn away from the deepest parts of myself. The parts of me
that are teeming with illogical, unbridled power. Diagnosing the liberal model of consent as a
pornographic conceptual framework shines a light on broader implications. I cannot live with a
framework that trades intersubjectivity for harm reduction. I believe that both should be able to
work together. We should be able to be safe, joyous, and orgasmic. Nietzsche, Irigaray, and
Lorde have each provided their accounts of intimate relation, and the stakes involved. As a
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reminder, Nietzsche warns against confusing love and avarice, though possession of a lover may
come easily it is not advisable. Ruling over a lover devalues the distance that is necessary for a
fruitful intimate relation. Allowing the other to be their own person opens up the possibility for
more creative maneuvering and play.
Irigaray emphasizes that language plays an important role in the possessive faculty that
Nietzsche endicts. She claims that the verb implies the impression of control, and that the
language of love much change to accommodate the assumptions that are built into semantics.
She offers the formulation “I love to you” as an alternative to the covetous “I love you.” I love to
you operates differently, the verb love is not impressed upon the lover, and the lover is no longer
the object of the sentence. The insertion of the modifier “to” changes everything, both I and you
are subjects of the phrase and whatever love is being sent out is merely directed toward the lover
rather than etched into them. The guidance that these two theorists provide opens up a new way
for thinking about sexuality, insofar as they provide the possibility for intersubjectivity. A way
towards a new sexual politics should be predicated on the preservation of distance as a means of
becoming closer, alongside a recognition that the language of sex should not privilege a
subject/object relation. The intersubjective relational model that I have been advocating for seeks
to reframe sex as a space for creativity. The liberal consent model I have been critiquing is rife
with blindspots that fail to deal with the material concerns that determine sexual encounter and
availability for sexual victimization.
Intersubjectivity, loving distance, and the recognition of difference should not be lost in
an attempt to deal with sexual harm. A new sexual ethics, one that seeks to guard against harm as
much as it advocates for pleasure, should be birthed out of the empowerment of women and
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gender minorities. People should not own their sexuality so much as be in touch with the erotic
power that can come to inform that sexuality. Enter Lorde, a true poet, who senses the urgent
need to stir up a trust in deep knowledge and feeling. Her work contains multitudes. Her uplifting
of the erotic is a starting place, she is interested in empowering her fellow black lesbians in order
to help them access the repressed lifeforce that is the erotic. The erotic builds in the tenants of
distance and intersubjectivity that Nietzsche and Irigaray advocate for. Her work is not interested
in providing ways of doing, so much as ways of being. A sexual model based on Lorde’s work,
and the accounts of the other authors I laid out in Chapter 1, would be guided by an attention to
feeling
““It feels right to me,” acknowledges the strength of the erotic into a true knowledge, for
what that means and feels is the first and most powerful guiding light towards understanding.
And understanding is a handmaiden which can only wait upon, or clarify, that knowledge, deeply
born. The erotic is the nurturer or nursemaid of all our deepest knowledge.” (Lorde, 4)
This attention to feeling does not rule out consent as an important feature of sexual life,
in fact it privileges the comfort and care that interpersonal consent is centered around. A model
of consent inspired by Lorde’s eroticism would simply deemphasize liberal consent, and the need
for institutional validation of painful and violating experiences. In the intersubjective relation
model of consent, there is no one story, no one survivor, no one way of atonement. In this model
the primary guide could be something like “that deep and irreplaceable knowledge of my
capacity for joy [that] comes to demand from all of my life that it be lived within the knowledge
that satisfaction is possible, and does not have to be called marriage, nor god, nor an afterlife”
(Lorde, 5) Gone is that Godless puritanism. Subjectivity is the guide, the responsiblizing feature,
and the judge.
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Lorde’s prescription is radical, for liberal feminism has failed to think about what
conditions of empowerment might feel like. She makes it explicitly clear that the erotic cannot be
accessed by those who operate solely to make their lives easier under heteropatriarchy. Using the
erotic as a source of power is not some simple order, it requires serious divestment and
risktaking. The erotic provides a means for those who can access it to trust themselves more
deeply, and to demand more of themselves and others “this is a grave responsibility, projected
from within each of us, not to settle for the convenient, the shoddy, the conventionally expected,
nor the merely safe.” (Lorde, 5) I see this as a chance at more sizzle, more hope, more
worldmaking. Again, the erotic is a starting point, but I genuinely believe it is life affirming. Not
only for me, but for you, for all of those who I direct my love out to.
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Conclusion: A Love Letter
Dear Reader,
We have come to the end of our exploration together, our boots are muddy and we are
covered with a pleasant sheen of sweat. I have enjoyed our time together, I hope that everything
has come to hang together for you. I wanted to write about sexuality and intimacy because I
believe it has stakes, and I want to cause others to think deeply about those stakes in a way that
can preserve difference. You and I are not the same, thank God for that. However, by some
miracle, we share a world. A world that I believe can and should change for the better. I think
you and I should find some way to speak the same language, to be able to take a walk on a nice
spring day and fall in love. I pray that you can take this model of intersubjectivity and extend it,
stretch it, hang it up on the wall, or gift it to the people who matter most in your life.
In making this work I have hit roadblocks that feel like dead ends that feel like the end of
the line. I have felt the beast encroaching. Nonetheless, I feel I have found a way to play around
and pave new roads in spite of my failures. Philosophy is a practice, and this work has allowed
me to meditate on new ways of explaining, writing, and reading. I have started to look for love in
every chapter, care on every dog eared page. Writing this work to you has been an act of
reclaiming my erotic powers. I wanted to write to you because I see you as something of your
own, you are not the receptacle for my ideas, rather a recipient. You could throw this copy in the
trash as long as it feels right. This is not a magnum opus, so much as it is a love letter. Many
lovers before me have had their letters torn to shreds or used as kindling. I think it touching your
hands, even for a mere moment, is a victory. I hope I will see you again in our dream.
Yours Faithfully.
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